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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JORETTA BUTTERFLIED,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Appellate Case No. 20030490CA
JAMES S. BUTTERFIELD,
Respondent/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(h). Appellant
appeals the trial court's Second Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Second Revised Decree of Divorce.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant's motion on the day of trial

to amend her admissions?

1

Standard ofReview: A trial court's decision to grant a Rule 36(b) motion is reviewed
"using what might be called a 'conditional' discretionary standard. In the first step, we
review the trial court's determinations as to whether amendment or withdrawal would
serve the presentation of the merits and whether amendment or withdrawal would result
in prejudice to the nonmoving party. In the second step, we review the trial court's
discretion to grant or deny the motion." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d
1058 (Utah 1998).

2.

Did the trial court err in determining that the premarital agreement was

enforceable?
Standard ofReview: "[T]he effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and,
therefore, one on which an appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's
determination. In recognition of this fact, the standard of review for such determinations
is termed one of'correctness.'" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

3.

Was it harmless error to deny alimony even if, arguendo, the premarital

agreement had been held to not be enforceable?
Standard ofReview: "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so
long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Childs v. Childs, 967
P.2d 942, 944 (Utah. Ct. App. 1998). "Where the trial court may exercise broad
discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice
or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of... discretion.'" Id.
2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
In relevant part, Rule 36 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provides as follows:
(a)(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request,
or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written
answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his
attorney....
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter deemed admitted under this rule is
conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or
amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing
amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action of defense on the merits.
In relevant part, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §30-8-6, provides:
(1) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement
is sought proves that:
(a) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(b) the agreement was fraudulent when it was executed and, before execution of
the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a reasonable disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party insofar as was possible;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond
the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge
of the property or financial obligations of the other party.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a divorce matter between the parties. Prior to the marriage, the parties
entered into a premarital agreement in which any claims to alimony were waived by both
parties. Appellant claimed the premarital agreement was unenforceable due to failure to
disclose assets, and sought alimony from Appellee. Due to Appellant's admissions on
record, the trial court found premarital agreement to be enforceable, and consequently
found alimony to be waived.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As Appellant asserts, the main contested issue in the divorce action below and in
this appeal involves Appellant's claim against Appellee for alimony. Accordingly, the
key issue behind alimony has been the enforceability of the parties' Premarital
Agreement.
The enforceability of the Premarital Agreement was first addressed at the Pre-trial
Settlement Conference held on July 1,2001, wherein the Commissioner suggested that
the "premarital agreement was unenforceable due to apparent deficiencies" in that it
"does not include a disclosure of assets." (R. at 77). This suggestion was made without
the court taking any evidence or testimony regarding the disclosure of assets at the
signing of the Premarital Agreement. The Commissioner also stated that it was
Appellant's burden to prove that Appellee was able to pay alimony given his income
from pension and social security. (R. at 77).

4

In the Minute Entry on a law and motion hearing held October 23,2001, the
Commissioner pointed out that he had previously considered the enforceability of the
Premarital Agreement and had recommended that it was unenforceable. (R. at 126). In
the resulting Order Denying Respondent's [Appellee's] Motion to Bifurcate and
Petitioner's [Appellant's] Counter-Motion for Temporary Alimony, Etc., entered on
November 27,2001, the Court found no evidence before the court showing Appellee's
income is more than Appellant's, and therefore there was no basis for her claim for
alimony. (R. at 133-135).
Appellee retained new counsel, whofileda Notice of Substitution of Counsel on
or about November 15, 2001. (R. at 127). To further the case, Appellee's new counsel
served Appellant with Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, and
Request for Admissions on or about November 20,2001. (R. at 129).
Appellant failed to respond to the request for admissions or to obtain an extension
of time with which to respond within the requisite 30 days. Consequently, on December
27, 2001, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Request
for Pre-Trial. (R. at 136). On December 31, 2001, Appellant belatedly filed a Certificate
of Service of her Answers to Request for Admissions. (R. at 143). Notice to Submit for
Decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on January 11, 2003. (R. at
148). Apparently due to the judge's illness, thefirsttrial date was stricken and
rescheduled (R. at 185) and the Notice to Submit was not addressed before the trial on
May 1,2002.

5

Prior to the trial, both parties filed Financial Declarations. Appellant reported a
net monthly income of $1,173 and monthly expenses of $2,003. (R. at 116-121).
Appellee reported a net monthly income of $2,969.41 and monthly expenses of
$3,123.98. (R. at 199-204).
Appellant makes issue that a contradictory Minute Entry was entered on May 6,
2001, after the trial, in which the Judge states that the admissions do not preclude
Appellant's claim for alimony. (Brief of Appellant at 11). This Minute Entry was entered
pursuant to a clerical error by the Court, and counsel for both parties were instructed to
shred the document. (R. at 219).
At the trial and after discussions in chambers, the judge denied Appellant's lastminute motion to amend the admissions. (R. at 460, page 3). The judge further stated,
"[I]t has been brought to my attention that the prenuptial agreement, the
enforceability of which has been deemed admitted, includes a waiver of alimony.
And it's my expectation that that will be offered today, and so as a matter of law, I
am ruling that no alimony will be awarded in this case."
(R. at 460 page 4). Appellant asked when the admissions were deemed admitted. (R. at
460, page 8). The judge responded that the matters were deemed admitted on day 31,
that pursuant to the rule, they are deemed admitted when they are late. (R. at 460, page
8). The judge related the conversation in chambers and clarified exactly the reasons for
his rulings regarding the admissions:
"And my remarks in chambers were to the best of my recollection as follows: Mr.
Friel [Appellant's counsel] asked me when I believed it would have been
appropriate for him to have been alerted that there was a problem concerning
request for admissions. I selected the date as being the date that he received the
papers from Ms. Colton [Appellee's counsel] raising this issue, which according to
what I was told in chambers, was December 26th or 27th or something like that.
6

Because to use the term I think I used in chambers, that's when the light bulb goes
on that there is a problem here concerning request for admissions.
I also noted that in these matters I have no discretion based on Lanquin vs.
Monarch Motors [sic], and that the Utah Supreme Court has articulated a means
by which parties seeking to withdraw matters deemed admitted can seek the leave
of court to have those matters withdrawn. That didn't happen here, and that led to
the rulings that I've made today with respect to those matters deemed admitted."
(R. at 460, pages 8-9).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in its determination that the premarital agreement
entered into by the parties prior to their marriage was enforceable, and thus any claim to
alimony had been waived by both parties. The sole issue regarding the enforceability of
the premarital agreement is the question of whether there was full disclosure of assets by
Appellee prior to the execution of the agreement.
Appellant was served with Requests for Admission on or about November 20,
2001. Appellant failed to timely respond to the Requests for Admission, and, pursuant to
Rule 36 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, the admissions were automatically
deemed admitted on December 27,2001, the day they were past due. One of the
admissions deemed admitted was that full disclosure of Appellee's property had been
made prior to the execution of the premarital agreement.
Appellant failed to take the appropriate steps to withdraw or amend her
admissions. According to Rule 36, the court would have discretion to grant a motion to
amend admissions only when doing so would serve the presentation of the merits and
would not result in prejudice to the nonmoving party.
7

Appellant sought to amend her admissions four months after they were deemed
admitted, on the day of the trial. The trial judge denied her motion, finding that
amending the admissions on the day of the trial would be unduly prejudicial to the party
who has to refigure his or her case in order to accommodate the withdrawal. Appellant
had not satisfied the preliminary conditions of Rule 36(b), which are required before the
judge has the discretion to grant a motion to amend the admissions. Nor had Appellant
satisfied the two-part test to show that the presentation of the merits would be served by
amending her admissions, as set forth in Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058,
1061 (Utah 1998). Therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to
amend her admissions; the trial court did not have the discretion to grant the motion.
Regardless of the existence of the admissions, Appellant failed to meet all three
elements required to prove the premarital agreement was unenforceable, as set forth in
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §30-8-6(1).

In the admissions, Appellant admitted she received

full disclosure of Appellant's property prior to signing the premarital agreement.
Furthermore, regardless of the admissions, Appellant was given full disclosure at the time
of the execution of the premarital agreement. Even absent this disclosure, Appellant was
part of Appellee's family for many years before their marriage and had knowledge of
Appellee's property, property which had been in the family for over 60 years. Therefore,
the premarital agreement is enforceable and alimony is waived.

8

Even if the premarital agreement had not been enforceable, and the statutory
factors for determining alimony1 had been applied, alimony would not have been
awarded to either party. Appellant may have shown need, with her expenses exceeding
her income, however Appellee's expenses also exceed his income and he has no capacity
or ability to pay. The court had previously stated that it saw no basis for alimony, as
there was no disparity in income. Appellee is 86 years old and retired, while Appellant is
61 years old and employed. The marriage lasted a mere two and one-half years before
separation. Alimony would not have been awarded in this case.
In sum, the trial court did not err in its determination that the premarital agreement
was enforceable. The trial court did not have the discretion to grant Appellant's motion
to amend her admissions, therefore the trial court's denial of the motion was not in error.
Regardless of the admissions, the premarital agreement was enforceable. Furthermore, if
either ruling had been an error, it would have been harmless error since alimony would
not have been granted.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALIMONY WAS WAIVED.
The Court did not err in determining that the premarital agreement signed by the

parties a week prior to their marriage was enforceable. The sole issue set forth regarding
the enforceability of the premarital agreement centered on whether there was full
1

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-3-5(8)(a).
9

property disclosure prior to signing. Appellant admitted in admissions that there was in
fact full disclosure, thus ending any question of fact with regard to the enforcement of the
premarital agreement. Even if the fact of full disclosure had not been admitted in
discovery, there still is evidence of full disclosure and/or reasonable prior knowledge.
Therefore, under Utah law, the premarital agreement was enforceable.

A.

The Requested Admissions Were Automatically Deemed Admitted And
Petitioner Did Not Take The Appropriate Steps To Amend Them.

In a Request for Admissions served upon Appellant on or about November 19,
2003, Admission Number 12 stated: "Admit that you were advised of all property owned
by the Respondent prior to signing the pre-nuptial agreement." (R. at 140). Appellant
was fully informed that, pursuant to Rule 36 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, the
matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless said request is
responded to within 30 days after service of the request. (R. at 137-138).
According to the Rule 36, the requested admissions were automatically deemed
admitted once Appellant failed to deny or object to them within the 30-day period.

UTAH

R. Civ. P. 36(b). This penalty provided in Rule 36 is intentionally harsh. Langeland v.
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). "Requests for admission must
be taken seriously, and answers or objections must be served promptly.... [P]arties who
fail to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 36 should not lightly escape the
consequences of the rule." Id. As such, once the admissions have been deemed admitted

10

against a party, more than a bare denial is required to convince the court that the
admissions should be withdrawn or amended. Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1062.
According to Rule 36(b), the court is given discretion to grant a motion to
withdraw or amend the admissions only when withdrawal or amendment would serve the
presentation of the merits and would not result in prejudice to the nonmoving party.
Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1060. The trial court does not have discretion to unilaterally
disregard the admissions. Id.
Utah courts have established a two-part test to show that a presentation of the
merits would be served by amendment or withdrawal of an admission. Pursuant to the
test, "the party seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) show that the matters deemed
admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of action, and (2)
introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that the
matters deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue." Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1062.
We first address the question of relevance of the admissions to the merits of the
case. Admission Number 12 asked Petitioner to admit "that you were advised of all
property owned by the Respondent prior to signing the pre-nuptial agreement." (R. at
140). Appellant asserts that the enforceability of the premarital agreement, in which
alimony is waived, is key to the issue of alimony and that the premarital agreement is all
that stands between Appellant and an alimony award. Appellant is incorrect on this
point. As will be more fully examined in Section II of this document, even without the
premarital agreement, alimony would not be appropriate in this case. For instance, the
marriage was of a short duration, all of Appellee's property constituted pre-marital assets,
11

both parties had similar income to expenses after separation, Appellee does not have the
ability or capacity to pay alimony, among the other factors state herein. Alimony should
not have been awardedregardless of the premarital agreement or regardless of the
admissions. As such, the admissions have little relevance on the merits of this case.
The second part of the test regarding the preservation of merits requires some
evidence indicating that the matters deemed admitted are in fact untrue. Appellant asserts
that her motion to amend her answers to admissions was accompanied by a supporting
affidavit. Neither the motion to amend nor the affidavit are contained in the court record,
and as such cannot be considered by this Court. State v. Pliego, 974 P.2d 279 (Utah 1999)
(quoting Wilderness Bids. Svs., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). An
Appellant's addendum may not consist of evidence that is outside the record on appeal,
therefore the Court should "strike this extraneous evidence and [] not consider it for
purposes of this appeal." Id. According to the trial transcript, the trial judge did entertain
a motion to amend, however, the documents included in Appellant's brief are not part of
the record and cannot be considered. Therefore, there is not evidence that the admissions
are in fact untrue.
After consideration of the preservation of merits, the court then considers any
resulting prejudice to the nonmoving party if the admissions are withdrawn or amended.
In this case, even though the first step regarding merits was not fulfilled, the issue of
prejudice is important to discuss. Appellant's motion to amend was brought forth on the
day of trial, four months after the admissions had been automatically deemed admitted.

12

This is highly prejudicial to Appellee, the nonmoving party. As Judge Nehring
explained:
"[W]hen matters have been deemed admitted, the lawyers structure their case
around what they have to prove and don't have to prove. And when an attempt is
made to withdraw the matters deemed admission [sic] literally on the day of trial,
it is unduly prejudicial to the party who would have to reconfigure his or her case
in order to accommodate the withdrawal of admissions."
(R. at 460, p. 3). Appellant had four months with which to address the admissions that
had been deemed admitted. As the judge pointed out at trial, she had further notice of the
problem with the admissions through Appellee's resulting Motion for Summary
Judgment, which was filed on December 27,2001. Yet no motion to amend was filed
until the day of the trial. Appellee appeared on the day of trial prepared to proceed with
his case with the included admissions, but was not prepared to prove issues previously
admitted. To allow an amendment or withdrawal of admissions under these
circumstances would have been extremely prejudicial to Appellee.
In sum, as detailed above, Appellant did not respond to the requested admissions
within the required 30-day period. Appellant attempted on the day of trial to amend her
admissions, however, she did not satisfy the preliminary conditions of Rule 36(b), which
are required before a judge has the discretion to grant a motion to amend the admissions.
Consequently, the trial judge appropriately denied the Appellant's motion to amend
admissions.

13

B.

The Premarital Agreement Is Enforceable, Therefore, Any Claim To
Alimony Is Waived.

After taking into account all the facts, with or without those facts deemed admitted
by Appellant, the premarital agreement is enforceable, and therefore alimony is waived.
A premarital agreement is not enforceable if a party did not execute the document
voluntarily or if the agreement was fraudulent.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-8-6(1). That the

premarital agreement in the present case was signed voluntarily has never been at issue,
therefore the focus turns to the second prong. A premarital agreement is not enforceable
if the party against whom enforcement proves that:
(b) the agreement was fraudulent when it was executed and, before execution of
the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a reasonable disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party insofar as was possible;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond
the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge
of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§30-8-6(1 )(b), emphasis added.

Appellant has failed to prove all three of the above required elements. Appellant,
through her admissions, admitted that she was given a reasonable disclosure of the
property or financial obligations of Appellee. Even if the admissions were not deemed
admitted, Appellant did have, or reasonably could have had, an adequate knowledge of
the property of Appellee. Appellant had been part of Appellee's extended family for
many years prior to their marriage; she was married to Appellee's prior wife's nephew
for approximately seventeen years before she married Appellant. As part of the family,
14

she knew of Appellee's real property, a family farm which had been in the family since
1941. Nothing was hidden or undisclosed at the time the parties signed the premarital
agreement.
It is important to also note that, even if Appellant had been able to show some
nondisclosure of assets prior to the signing of the premarital agreement, Appellant would
have failed to show that such a nondisclosure was material. "[F]ailure to disclose each
and every asset and liability will not automatically invalidate a premarital agreement.
Instead, a court must first ascertain whether a party failed to disclose, and if so, it must
then determine whether that failure was "material." In re Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d
1343, 1348 (Utah 1994). The division of property has never been at issue in this case.
Consequently, even if it had been necessary for the trial court to determine whether there
had been proper disclosure, any possible nondisclosure would have been immaterial. As
such, the premarital agreement would still have been held to be valid and enforceable.
Appellant attempts to make issue of a Minute Entry supposedly entered on May 6,
2001, five days after the trial, in which the judge states that the admissions do not
preclude Appellant's claim for alimony. This Minute Entry, however, was entered due to
a clerical error of the Court, and counsel for both parties were instructed to shred the
document. (R. at 219). Appellant says in her brief that the Minute Entry makes no sense,
which is obvious given the clerical mistake. Appellant also makes issue of a prior
recommendation by the Commissioner that the premarital agreement is not enforceable.
This recommendation was made prior to the completion of discovery. Once discovery

H

was completed, the facts and issues before the court changed, thus requiring a different
ruling by the trial judge.
In sum, the premarital agreement between the parties is enforceable. Appellant
failed to meet all three elements required to prove a premarital agreement was fraudulent
and therefore unenforceable. Regardless of the existence of the admissions, Appellant
has failed to prove the premarital agreement is unenforceable. Furthermore, the
premarital agreement includes a provision that each party waives any claim of alimony
from the other. As such, Appellant's claim to alimony has been waived.

II.

EVEN IF THE COURT HAD DETERMINED THAT THE PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE. THERE WOULD NOT BE AN
ALIMONY AWARD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Arguendo, even if the premarital agreement had not been enforceable, and thus

alimony not waived, and the court had gone forward to determine whether alimony
should be granted, it would be harmless error2 because alimony still would not have been
awarded to either party.
According to statute, the court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

2

the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
the length of the marriage;
whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor children requiring
support;

See UTAH R. CIV. P. Rule 61.
16

(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the
payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse
or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §30-3-5(8)(a).

In considering these factors, it is extremely unlikely that a trial court would grant
Appellant alimony in view of the specific facts of this case. According to the Financial
Declarationsfiledby both parties, Appellant has a net income of $1,173 per month, with
monthly expenses of $2,003. Appellee has a net income of $2,969.41 per month or less,
with monthly expenses of $3,123.98. Appellant may have some need, with expenses
exceeding her income, however Appellee has no capacity or ability to pay. Appellee is
86 years old and living on social security, retirement, and small interest payments from
an LLC. Appellant is 61 years old and employed. The marriage lasted a mere two and
one-half years before the parties separated. There are no children, business, or education
issues in this case. These are not circumstances in which a court will even possibly grant
alimony.
Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the Jones3
factors for determining alimony and by failing to issue specific findings of fact. It is
important to note, however, that the trial court found that both parties waived any claims
to alimony in the premarital agreement. Due to this waiver of alimony, the facts of the
record are in fact "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of judgment," Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
3

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
17

(citations omitted), therefore consideration of the Jones factors and specific findings of
fact were unnecessary.
Consequently, even if Appellant were to succeed in her appeal, have the lower
court overturned, and the case remanded for findings with regard to alimony, it would be
harmless error; an alimony award for Appellant would not result.
CONLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's judgment in this case. Appellee also requests that the Court strike the
extraneous evidence contained in Appellant's Addendum.

DATED this 2 l day of December 2003.

David Paul White
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
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